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Islam vs. Liberalism in Europe 
Introduction 
Peter O'Brien 
Hate is more important for the hater 
than the object of his hate. 
- Vaclav Havel 
In the West, Muslilms are regarded with anxiety, mistrust, and fear. 
Many of us choose not to travel to Muslim countries for fear of becoming 
victims of terrorism. Most westerners worry about the Muslims' finn grip 
on the spigot of the world's oil reserves. And in 1991 we convinced our­
selves that Saddam Hussein represented a threat on par with Hitler. 1 
But Muslims cannot really scare us. After all, it took but a few weeks 
to vanquish fully the "Butcher of Baghdad," who had up until that time 
the world's fourth largest army. We united in a stalwart international co­
alition against the Iraqi menace, while most of Saddam's supposed Arab 
allies joined our ranks. We need only to remember the Iran-Iraq war to 
console ourselves with the memory of an internecine inter-Muslim 
struggle, something not seen in the West since the Second World War. 
Granted, each of us can probably recall some personal hardship 1973 and 
1979 when the Arabs or Iranians withheld "our'' oil. Now, however, we 
all realize, along with such economists as Maddison (1982), that these 
embargoes merely exacerbated imminent or existing world recesfilons. 
More comfortingly, as Issawi (1982) has shown, the great eastwood 
flood of petrodollars in the 1970s was eventually channeled back through 
Peter O'Brien is an assistant professor of Political Science at Trinity University, San 
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'For a discussion of the historical and ideological roots of western views on Muslims, 
see Rodinson (1987) and Said (1978). 
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western banks to fuel the economic boom of the following decade. Even 
that worst of hostage crises, in Tehran in 1980, ended in the release of all 
captives due to the restraint exhibited by the kidnappers and the Iranian 
government. Most of our hostages, we must admit, are now back home 
safe and sound. These unfortunate events seem rather feeble when com­
pared to our proven ability to hold, in effect, all of Iraq hostage, leaving 
perhaps as many as three hundred thousand dead before the ordeal ended. 
More curiously, Europeans show great concern over the ten million 
Muslim migrants residing in their countries. In 1979 and 1980, for ex­
ample, German newspapers featured countless exposes and worrisome 
editorials about the discovery of some one thousand Qur'an schools in the 
Federal Republic. In 1989, the French entangled themselves in a bitter na­
tional debate over the refusal of several Muslim girls to abandon their 
l;ijiib (head scarves) before entering a public school. At roughly the same 
time, the British government felt it necessary to marshal its security 
forces to hide and protect a single author-Salman Rushdie-from Mus­
lim assassins. 
These misgivings see� exaggerated. The Irish Republican Anny daily 
threatens the lives of numerous British subjects. Muslim-related distur­
bances (i.e., the Turkish-led wildcat strike in Cologne's Ford factory in 
1973 or the Paris riots of 1991) have been sporadic and easily quelled. 
It would also do well to recall the overwhelming majority of Muslims in 
Europe cannot vote. Even if they could, their small numbers preclude any 
electoral impact. Moreover, resident aliens are subject to easy deportation 
if they act up. And to be sure, those few Muslim girls, just like the pupils 
attending Qur'an schools, were merely exercising the right of religious 
freedom celebrated and guaranteed in both the French and German consti­
tutions. 
How do we explain our anxiety? Following Havel's insight, I sug­
gest that our fears have much more to do with ourselves than with Mus­
lims. In particular, I argue that the perceived standoff with Muslims 
makes us doubt the sincerity and supposed superiority of our convictions, 
which are predominantly liberal in origin and orientation. The Muslim 
critique and rejection of European liberalism lead us to question our most 
revered beliefs; we respond by trying to persuade or compel them to em­
brace our liberal principles. When they resist, we see no recourse but to 
exercise arbitrary power over them. But our liberal tenets offer no con­
vincing justification for this. In a sense, we are like the insecure neigh­
borhood bully; we do not doubt our capacity to bully our Muslim neigh­
bors, but wc have difficulty justifying our behavior to ourselves. We do 
not distrust and fear Muslims so much as we distrust and fear ourselves. 
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Liberalism Defmed 
Liberalism has its roots in the Enlightenment. The core of liberalism 
is thus epistemological and ontological, although we now asrociate it with 
general political, economic, social, and cultural aspects (i.e., civil liberties 
and representative government, free markets, modem and pluralistic so­
cieties, and such values as critical reason and tolerance). Its founding 
fathers are such great thinkers as Bacon, Newton, Locke, and Descartes, 
all of whom made pioneering epistemological and ontological break­
throughs. They debunked the arguments and authority of Scholasticism 
and demonstrated the pos.5ibility and the superiority of autonomous reason 
and scientific inquiry. Each in his own way argued that an individual had 
the capacity to reason and thus could fully comprehend his/her world. 
Newton's call to understand "Natural Philosophy [and] Mathematical 
Principles," Bacon's to "go to the facts for everything," Locke's to "con­
sult reason," and Descartes' conclusion that "Cogito, ergo sum" all are 
rooted in the belief that the world is intelligible to human beings through 
reason. 
These and other individuals argued that we can understand our world 
as well as know our own best self-interests. It is only our misguided con­
ventions, whether custom, coercion, or superstition, that derail the pursuit 
of our self-interests. We simply need to have the courage to abandon 
these comfortable, but enslaving, conventions. Thus Kant declared the 
purpose and challenge of the Enlightenment in this way: "Enlightenment 
is man's exodus from his self-incurred tutelage ... dare to know! Have 
the courage to use your own understanding; this is the motto of the 
Enlightenment" (Friedrich 1949). 
Such thinkers believed that knowledge of the natural and the human 
worlds was reducible to simple facts and relationships and, therefore, 
communicable through unambiguous phrases and principles (expressed 
mathematically wherever pos.5ible). Consequently, all persons could 
achieve objective knowledge, for it was akin to common sense. Descartes 
averred that 
Good sense is of all things in the world the most equitably dis­
tributed ... the power of judging well and of distinguishing be­
tween the true and the false, which, properly speaking, is what is 
called good sense, or reason, is by nature equal in all men." 
(Smith 1958) 
We aS.50Ciate these discoveries with liberalism because they depend 
on freedom. Reason must be autonomous and free of superstition. The in-
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stirutions that developed out of the Enlightenment and still characterize 
our societies also stress freedom. We espouse free and universal educa­
tion so that everyone can exercise his/her capacity to reason. We promote 
free markets so that self-knowing human beings can pwsue their own in­
terests. We construct free polities with civil liberties and representative 
institutions so that all citizens can voice and discuss their concerns. 
Tiris concept of free agency lies at the heart of liberalism. It rep­
resents not only the normative claim that all human beings should be free, 
but also rests on the empirical assertion that free petsons will necessarily 
discern and a5.5ent to the truths perceived by these great thinkers. Even 
RoU5.5eau's admission that to enlighten human beings would prove to be 
quite difficult, and would necessitate forcing them to be free, actually 
celebrates freedom, for Emile, once forced to be free, is absolutely certain 
of the validity of his learned ways and appreciative of his mentor's com­
pulsory methods. 
In addition, thinkers of the Enlightenment promised that freedom 
would bring progress and power to human beings. Free inquiry and edu­
cation would allow scientists to discover the laws of nature and therefore 
to control it. Bacon simply equated knowledge and power. Adam Smith 
demonstrated that actors in the free market, as if led by an invisible hand, 
would naturally enhance its efficiency and order. John Stuart Mill be­
lieved that the clash of ideas and opinions made possible by free po�itical 
institutions would inevitably produce the best public policy. And Kant 
thought that freedom, when coupled with reason, would lead to "the king­
dom of ends" and "perpetual peace." 
These grand hopes rested on what Spragen.5 (1981) has called "epis­
temological manicheanism." According to him, the Enlightenment divided 
the world into two realms: the kingdom of coercion, superstition, ignor­
ance, self-enslavement-in a word, darkness-and the kingdom of truth, 
reason, progress, self-mastery-in a word, light.2 Liberty represented a 
kind of bridge from the former to the latter. As such, liberty became vir­
tually synonymous with prudence, perfection, and power. Nothing could 
prevent free petsons from improving, indeed perfecting, themselves and 
their world. 
Needless to say, countless subsequent thinkers in our own tradition 
have given us cause to question the Enlightenment's unswerving faith in 
human sagacity, morality, and progress. Marx exposed the dysfunctions 
of the free market. Nietzsche chipped away at, indeed tore down, the 
foundations of western science and morality. Shelley depicted the 
21 have drawn heavily on this work for the inspiration behind this essay. 
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Frankensteinian nightmare of our scientific discoveries. Weber attuned us 
to the disenchantment and self-entrapment of our rational, efficient bu­
reaucracies. Freud revealed our subliminal irrationalities and discontents. 
Orwell shocked us with his demonstration of the abuse and distortion of 
language. Joseph Schumpeter portrayed democracy as a political ideology 
no different from others used by leaders to sway the masses. And Walter 
Lippmann uncovered widespread support for pre-Enlightenment values in 
mass public opinion. 
I couJd extend the list indefinitely, for many thinkers have pursued, 
broadened, and strengthened the unsettling insights of these modem 
skeptics and cynics. We live today in what Beck ( 1992) calls the "risk 
society." More than at any time in human history, we are sensitive to and 
frightened by the risks and dangers created by our own fabrications, be 
they nuclear, environmental, genetic, economic, or political. Furtherm.ore, 
the ultimate source of our doubts and fears is our own "reflexivity," as 
both Beck (1992) and Giddens (1991) have pointed oul We have turned 
the Enlightenment's most powerful weapon-reason-on the Enlighten­
ment itself and used this weapon to doubt and/or discredit our noblest 
achievements. 
Beck and Giddens also note that most of us resist these conclusions. 
Conceding them amounts to recognizing our most cherished values, insti­
tutions, and accomplishments as quixotic delusions. Like the Spanish hero 
Don Quixote, we find it discomforting and debilitating to gaze into the 
mirror. We choose, instead, to gallop onwards with our heads held high 
in the self-righteousness. Accordingly, cynics are not our onJy esteemed 
thinkers. Many writeis have gained fame and acclaim by protecting the 
Enlightenment against its assailants. Naqel, Hempel, and Popper have 
redoubled efforts to demonstrate the possibility of objective knowledge 
in science. Friedman and Hayek have renewed and reinvigorated faith in 
the free market. Rawls and Habermas have redefined and reconfinned 
basic Kantian ethics and politics. Each of these men and others like them 
staunchly defended human rationality and freedom. For Nagel, Hempel, 
and Popper these concepts are vindicated by the exacting methodologist 
devoted to verification yet open to falsification; for Friedman and Hayek 
by the rational economic individual capable of knowing his/her own in­
terests if free to do so; for Rawls and Habennas by the thinking ethical 
self free, behind the "veil of ignorance" or in the "ideal speech situation," 
from the contingencies, prejudices, and coercions of history and society. 
Most westerners cannot find the time to read and consider these 
thoughtful treatises. We therefore look for more obvious and available 
confirmations of our beliefs. Perhaps nothing has done more to soothe our 
insecurities and affirm our confidence than the collapse of communism 
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in the Soviet empire. We like to think that the people of eastern Europe 
finally deposed their oppressors because they cherished the same ideals 
we hold so dear. The vigorous attempts of the succ�r regimes to seek 
our aid and emulate our ways further strengthen our belief in the validity 
and superiority of our principles and practices. The relentless campaign 
undertaken by our governments to proselytize the "western way of life" 
throughout eastern Europe and elsewhere has played, I think, a crucial 
role in buttressing our self-confidence, for, as we gain converts to our 
faith, we can take solace in the idea that our beliefs represent, at worst, 
the best option available and, at best, the universally superior option. We 
liberals feed on converts, because the internal logic of liberalism demands 
the constant assent of rational free agents. 
Muslim Resistance 
Muslims attract our attention and antipathy because they refuse to 
convert. All across the Arabian peninsula, for instance, we see the per­
sistence of monarchies. Moreover, the people living under this vestigial 
medieval authority seem to tolerate it. In 1979, the Iranians overthrew 
their westward-looking, modernizing Shah and submitted, in the West's 
opinion, to a "regressive" state governed by "antiquated" Islamic law. 
Examples of resistance to assimilation are far less dramatic in Europe 
but no less apparent. Muslim migrants tend to congregate in ethnic en­
claves or ghettos where they reestablish and perpetuate the old customs 
of the homeland (Anwar I 979). They form their own exclusive organi­
zations that spurn association with non-Muslim groups (Oezcan 1989). 
Many Muslims forbid their children to go to public schools or force them 
to attend Qur' an schools where they unlearn what is taught in public 
classes (Irskens 1977). The majority of these migrants appear to object to 
consorting with or manying westerners, donning western dress, or mas­
tering western languages (Abdullah 1981). Everywhere we tum Muslims 
are telling us they do not wish to be like us. 
But why? We often conveniently point to fanaticism, obscurantism, 
and demagoguery. Doubtless Islam has its fair share of fanatics, like any 
worldview. Thus some Muslim critics profes.5 apocalyptic visions of im­
minent western decline and rnes.5ianic predictions of Muslim ascendancy 
(Cemile 1985). We focus on these eccentrics, like the self-styled Turkish 
prophet Cemalettin Kaplan in Cologne (Stern 1987), because we wish to 
ignore more thoughtful and penetrating critics. Given our liberal presump­
tions, the idea of a reasoned yet resolute rejection of liberalism strikes us 
as oxymoronic and thus impossible. 
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Islamic critiques of western liberalism, generally speaking, can be 
divided into two sorts. The first underscores western hypocrisy; West­
erners refuse to extend or guarantee to Muslims the same basic rights and 
privileges that all human beings deserve. Muslim authors often rail 
against the erroneous image of Islam promoted by the western media and 
anchored in popuJar opinion. They complain that Europeans fail to apply 
their much touted reason, open-mindedness, and tolerance when evaluat­
ing Islam. For example, few Europeans object when nuns choose to wear 
a habit as an expression of their piety or to live segregated in convents. 
But when Muslim women cover their heads with scarves or their bodies 
with nonrevealing gannents, or refuse to participate in activities invo:Jving 
men, westerners cry "patriarchy," "domination," and "injustice." In the 
early 1980s, the government of Northrhine-W estfalen resolved to provide 
Islamic religious instruction in the public schools, but then went on to es­
tablish a commission of Christian theologians to draft the curriculum. 
Muslim organizations vehemently opposed the plans, arguing that Chris­
tians wouJd never tolerate a Christian curricuJum written by Muslims. 
Similarly, whereas Muslims recognize Christianity as a legitimate faith, 
only the Roman Catholic Church, not the evangelical churches, has recip­
rocated such a recognition. Furthennore, the Federal RepubHc of Ger­
many has declared the Roman Catholic and Evangelical churches "recog­
nized reHgions" -a legal status that entitles them to significant financial 
assistance from the state. Yet it has not done the same for Islam, despite 
its roughly two mi!Uon adherents in Germany. In the words of the Is­
lamische FOderation in Berlin (1986): 
If we in Berlin are to fashion our future together, then it does not 
suffice to support the justified demands of the black population 
in South Africa; it is far more necessary to support these free­
doms and rights in Berlin itself, and for all of the faithful.3 
On the other hand, Europeans have exhibited respect and sympathy 
for such criticisms. In Holland and Sweden, for example, Muslim mi­
grants have been accorded the right to vote in local elections. In Ger­
many, the Green Party has proposed enactment of a "right to settle" that 
would grant resident aliens all of the rights of citizenship without re­
quiring naturalization. In France, S.O.S. Racisme has doggedly spoken 
out against various forms of discrimination. In most European polities, 
Muslims have won important court cases to protect their civil liberties 
3This entire document is a persuasive example of the critique of European hypocrisy. 
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(Th.r8nhardt 1986). Cries of hypocrisy gain limited sympathy because 
they, in effect, demand that liberal values be applied to Muslims. 
Criticisms of the second sort are far more threatening, for they 
generally follow the same line of argument proffered by the West's own 
skeptics and cynics. They contend that the free market has not liberated 
human beings; it has rather enslaved them to the machine, consumerism, 
and raw materialism. Moreover, liberal ethics have hardly produced so­
cieties characterized by perpetual peace. Violence, aggression, exploita­
tion and alienation run rampant in western societies. "It must be regret­
tably acknowledged," concluded one critic, "that Western civilisation's 
shortcomings and weaknesses are no fewer than its advantages . . . 
despite the new pages of history turned, human happiness has not in­
creased nor have social ills diminished." (Lari 1977) 
These problems persist, moreover, not because the liberal project has 
yet to be completed, but because its underlying assumptions are pro­
foundly flawed. Liberal tenets cannot stand up to "logical scrutiny." As 
a result, 
modem man, more than any of his predecessors, can construct 
man, but knows less than any of them what it is he is construct­
ing ... these new ideologies ... fall short of answering basic 
human needs and . : . they either lead people to a sense of 
futility, or draw them into bondage. (Shari 'ati 1980) 
Such writers do not always reserve their criticism for the West; in­
deed, many have led efforts to reveal and reform the shortcomings of Is­
lamic civilization itself.4 But they aim to disabuse their readers of the 
urge to romanticize and emulate western liberalism, which, they insist, of­
fers no indisputably superior answers for humanity. Look to your own 
tradition for answers, they implore.5 
Liberalizing Muslims 
We choose not to see or hear these reasoned critiques of liberalism. 
We believe that the logic of liberalism teaches that free and rational 
thinking perforce culminates in the acceptance, not rejection, of 
4For a description of the longstanding internal debates about the strengths and 
weaknesses of Islamic principles and practices, see Voll (1982). 
-'1b.is theme is stressed, for instance, in the second paragraph of the preamble to the 
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
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liberalism. In response, we -focus attention on the varied forces that 
allegedly obstruct the Muslims' way of reasoning. The social scientific 
analyses of the situation of Muslim communities in Europe has produced 
a voluminous literature. Since roughly the late 1960s, European govem­
ments have commissioned thousands of these studies.6 Despite the glut of 
such research, however, most of it contains a common theme-the experi­
ence of migrating from traditional (Muslim) to modem (westem) societies 
inevitably causes rapid and disorienting change. In other words, trans­
planted virtually overnight from village to metropolis, they find adjust­
ment to the pace and demands of modem life difficult and threatening. 
They cling to their traditions (be they the patriarchal family, outdated reli­
gious precepts, or authoritarian political beliefs) in a fruitless attempt to 
escape or slow change and its corrosive consequences. Stubborn adher­
ence to tradition, in the words of one Gennan analyst, 
should not be understood as a natural continuation of the lifestyle 
in the homeland, rather as a defense against the changed environ­
ment. The confrontation with the divergent ways of the surround­
ing world creates in every case a sense of uncertainty, a strain on 
the personality. [This leads] to signs of retreat and compensation, 
such as exaggeration of traditional norms and values, idealizing 
the homeland, avoidance of contact with the German envitron­
ment. (Neumann 1980) 
These defensive reactions are not "natural," according to western 
analysts. Muslims are thus typically diagnosed as suffering from various 
psychological and social disorders, including "anomie," "anxiety," "culture 
shock," "identity confusion," "fragmentation of the self-image," "deficient 
self-confidence," "deficient ego identity," "psychic overload," or "socio­
cultural stress." Moreover, these symptoms cause such unnatural and de­
viant behaviors: resignation, escapism, excessive consumption, aggression, 
crime, and extremism (Ronneberger 1977; Albrecht and Pfeiffer 1979). 
Such analyses essentially divide Muslims and Europeans into two 
distinct classes of actors. Europeans are assumed to be free agents who 
employ reason to act naturally and normally, while Muslims, by contrast, 
are depicted as irrational and not (yet) free to think or act reasonably. 
These studies ignore the political, cultural, and racial distinctions between 
Muslims and Europeans; rather they concentrate on a more palatable epis­
temological distinction. In a nutshell, we do not view and treat Muslims 
6See, for instance, the four-hundred-page bibliography in Gliedner-Simon (1986). 
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differently because they hold foreign passports, believe in a different God, 
come from non-European stock, or even have darker complexions-they 
simply have not had the opportunity to reason freely. 
Both the liberal diagnosis and distinction detennine the solution to the 
Muslim problem. The West's goal becomes clear: to liberate and en­
lighten the Muslim population. For sociologists, this usually means re­
ducing or eliminating the social inequalities that keep Muslims living in 
Europe in a state of marginalization and underpivilege. Such authors pre­
scribe social programs designed to provide Muslims opportunities in 
housing, education, and employment equal to those enjoyed by Europeans 
(Hoffman-Nowotny and Hondrich 1982). For psychologists and peda­
gogues, the cure involves resocializing Muslims (usually the young ones 
whose minds are still malleable) to the modem liberal values prevalent 
in the West. Accordingly, they endorse programs that fully absorb and in­
tegrate Muslim pupils into the public educational system. 
Such prescriptions aim to make Muslims more "like us," either by 
giving them the same opportunities (or freedoms) we have or by instruct­
ing them in our ways. Such proposals view Muslims not as human 
beings, but as human matter to be molded after our own image; they are 
grounded in the belief that Muslims will embrace our ways once they are 
given the opportunities, resources, and assistance to do so. Thus the Ger­
man sociologist Esser (1980) predicts that integrated foreigners eventually 
will assimilate the modem norms and values that maintain "system equi­
librium" in the Federal Republic. Even proposals for "multicultural educa­
tion," which integrate Muslim beliefs and experiences into the general 
curriculum, ultimately seek to inculcate classic Enlightenment values in 
Muslim and European pupils. Proponents of  multicultural education argue 
that it "dismantles prejudices and nationalisms, facilitates tolerance for the 
strange and different, and awakens empathy for the situation of 'the 
other' rather than competitiveness" (Essinger and Hellmich 1981). 
These analyses and proposals have not gone unheeded. The govern­
ments of European countries with large migrant populations launched and 
sustained extensive campaigns to integrate migrants into the mainstream 
of society throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Comprehensive social welfare 
programs were expanded to include resident aliens as well as citizens. 
Special housing, language, and vocational and cultural programs were 
devised to as.5ist foreigners in their adjustment to western life. Educa­
tional programs were aimed at making second-generation migrants into 
equal citizens by the time they reach maturity (Thriinhardt 1986). One 
study likened these efforts to the development of an entirely new "in­
dustry" replete with products and specialists, research and degrees, insti­
tutes and agencies, marketers and salespersons (Griese 1984). 
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In my opinion. such initiatives tend to depoliticize relations between 
Muslims and Europeans. Generally speaking. they assist but do not em­
power their subjects. Muslim migrants enjoy the right to vote or run for 
public office in only a few European lands. Consequently, they are ex­
cluded from participating in the design of programs and policies aimed 
at them. More importantly. this critical division of labor and power rests 
on epistemological, rather than political, assumptions and justifications. 
Europeans vest themselves with the authority to act on and for Muslims 
on the basis of their liberal understanding that they know, better than the 
Muslims themselves, what is best for the newcomers. European policy­
makers act as the self-appointed doctors and therapists of Muslims rather 
than their politically chosen representatives. When it comes to Muslims, 
therefore, Europeans excuse themselves from the political accountability 
they demand in their own relation.5. 
Muslims find themselves entrapped in an apolitical Catch-22 common 
to all technocratic projects. If they accept the European assistance, they 
in effect assent to the image of themselves as nonreasoning nonliberals 
in need of European aid and instruction. If they resist or insist that they 
are being coerced into integrative programs, such recalcitrance is taken 
as yet another symptom of their ailment and, therefore, grounds for fur­
ther treatment. To be sure, the logic of liberalism does not allow for a 
free and reasoned critique or rejection of the liberal order and its under­
lying axioms. Only free and rational agents deserve the political rights as­
sociated with liberalism; irrational actors require liberation from their ir­
rational tutelage. And as self-styled western liberals we see it as our right 
and duty to be the Muslims' liberators. 
Arbitrary and Nonliberal Recourses 
The problem with MU5lims residing in Europe is that they refuse to 
be liberated. First and foremost, they demand political rights so that they 
themselves can determine what is best for them. When the Muslim girls 
showed up at school wearing the /Jijiib, they were insisting on their right 
to free worship as well as the right to resist or reject the teachings of 
French public schools. Turkish parents make a similar political statement 
when they whisk their children off to Qur'an schools immediately follow­
ing German classes. Countless Islamic organizations in Europe refuse to 
participate in official programs of integration, even if it means forfeiting 
much-needed public assistance. For instance, mosques in Europe typically 
offer their visitors much more than a place of worship; they also provide 
an array of social services parallel to but independent of those offered by 
European governments (V0cking 1984). 
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Such acts of resistance trouble and alarm us, for they seem to snub 
our generous attempts to offer the fruits of liberalism. Unlike their 
brothers and sisters in faraway places who might not yet be sufficiently 
exposed to liberal values or assistance, Muslims in Europe eschew liberal­
ism despite its ready availability. Nothing perturbs and perplexes Euro­
peans as much as the documented tendency among Muslim migrants to 
resist naturalization. Schemes have been devised to offer migrants the 
chance to become citizens of their host societies. Most involve liberaliz­
ing the requirements for naturalization for second-generation aliens, who 
are perceived as the most willing and able to assimilate western norms 
and values. They also entail swearing an oath of allegiance to the liberal 
principles enunciated in European constitutions once young migrants 
reach adulthood. The policies assume that after living in the West from 
an early age and being socialized in public schools, western-educated 
Muslims will seek citizenship and embrace the values it embodies. 
Our liberal logic has not prepared us for the fact that Muslims will 
not take the oath. We believe that free, rational adults will by nature as­
sent to liberalism, and that because liberal societies are justly constructed 
and organized, they are worthy of the approval of free and rational per­
sons. If we take Muslims seriously, we must face the prospect that liberal 
principles and practices engender discontent and disapproval. Moreover, 
if we admit that Muslims are free and rational agents, we must conclude, 
from their rejection, that they perhaps know something about liberalism 
that has escaped our scrutiny. And this, in tum, would suggest that our 
own acceptance of liberalism has not been as free or rational as we think. 
Rather than recognize these unsettling possibilities, we choose to per­
sist in the belief that Muslims' troubles Lie with themselves rather than 
with us. We conclude that the antiquated customs and mores they bring 
with them from their homelands are more firmly rooted than originally 
conceived. As a result, their misfortune is greater than expected. We see 
no option but to judge the differences between us and them as en­
trenched, perhaps immutable. In this way, Muslims come to be viewed 
as external agitators-foreign threats in our midst whose alien naiture runs 
far deeper than the possession of a different passport. As many post­
structuralists note, the sense of difference and "otherness" we fed towards 
Muslims stems more from the subjective image we wish to have of our­
selves than from objective attributes common to Muslims (Said 1978). 
But we resolve, then, that their misfortune should not become our 
misfortune.7 We can and must endeavor to reform them. If they resist re-
'I have borrowed this idea from Honig (1991). 
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fortn, we must limit or eliminate their widesirable influences on our 
societies. Accordingly, after roughly two decades of progressive and in­
tegrative legislation, we see throughout Europe in the late 1980s and early 
1990s mounting calls and sympathies for tougher, more restrictive poli­
cies towards Muslim and other non-European migrants and refugees. The 
European Community, for instance, has initiated steps to "harmonize" the 
laws governing political asylum in member states in the hope of prevent­
ing refugees from trying their luck from one country to the next. Pro­
posals have been submitted to institute "immigration quotas" that would 
place a ceiling on the number of immigrants and, in some cases, desig­
nate the countries from which immigrants would be accepted. The fact 
that xenophobic parties, like the National Front in France, or the Repub­
licans in Gennany, have made significant gains throughout Europe in re­
cent elections reinforces such trends. 
Such restrictive proposals and policies all blame migrants and absolve 
Europeans of responsibility for the problems associated with large-scale 
migration. Calls to limit immigration have typically been justified on the 
grounds that Europeans cannot possibly absorb all of the world's poor 
and persecuted. In other words, the problems of the Third World are 
simply too complex and intractable to be solved by an open-door policy 
for refugees. Moreover, Europe has its own problems, particularly now 
as western Europeans have taken on the responsibility aiding their eastern 
European neighbors in the transition from dictatorship to democracy. For 
example, in response to neo-Nazi disturbances in such cities as Rostock, 
Christian Democrats reconfirmed and Social Democrats conceded to the 
German government's plan to stem the tide of immigration into the newly 
united country. In so doing, the parties effectively claimed that both the 
cause of and the responsibility for the disturbances lie not with the neo­
Nazis but with the foreigners, whose numbers have grown beyond ac­
ceptability. Perhaps this also explains the limited, and at times reluctant, 
police protection given to the victims of neo-Nazi terror-as well as the 
lenient sentences handed out lo the convicted perpetrators. 
Such acts trouble our conscience and offend our sensibilities because 
we see no viable alternative yet cannot justify them with our liberal 
convictions. We have been taught that the only effective and ethical way 
to deal with nonliberals is to liberalize them. Moreover, the liberal para­
digm has assured us that all human beings by nature possess the capacity 
and desire to become liberals when free to do so. Coercion should play 
no role. Our societies are self-governing and self-legitimating. 
When the liberal cure fails to heal our social wounds, however, we 
find no choice but to accept the older idea that Muslims and Europeans 
have immutable and insurmountable differences. Yet it is precisely these 
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kinds of irrational and arbitrary distinctions, whether religious, racial, na­
tionalist, or ethnic, that liberalism was supposed to overcome and trans­
cend. When we cannot convince Muslims of the universality of our 
liberal views of human nature and morality, we see no recourse but to 
discipline and coerce them. Such tactics and rationales, which belong to 
a preliberal era, force us to acknowledge, uncomfortably, that we are less 
liberal than we believe. After all, is there a genuine philosophical or ethi­
cal difference between the policies of liberal governments that discourage 
the entrance and encourage the exit of Muslims, and the slogans of the 
National Front or Republican Party that France exists for the French and 
that Germany exists for the Germans? The only difference lies in the fact 
that the xenophobes feel perfectly "justified in bullying Muslims, whereas
we do not. This, more than anything else, explains why the Muslim pre­
sence in Europe causes us so much anxiety. 
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